What is Yanartas?
In the Yanartas project, we are creating a family of tamper sensor hardware designs that are designed to run ashen-firmware. The first sensor we are creating is an advanced mesh-based tamper sensor using Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR), with later designs adding environmental sensors and other niceties.
Important
Ashen is currently work in progress! It's currently at the design stage, with prototypes planned for end of the year 2026. jaseg is working on it full time. Prototypes are planned for early December, and we are planning a first release for late spring 2027. We're open for collaborations and contributions—feel free to reach out via email.
Tamper Sensors
The goal of a HSM tamper sensor is to detect someone trying to physically manipulate the HSM, without triggering false alarms during normal operation. Manipulations someone could attempt range from simply looking at the device, through probing electrical signals using e.g. an oscilloscope, up to attacks like fault injection or micro-probing.
The usual way to implement HSM tamper sensors is to package the HSM in some reasonably sturdy, shielded enclosure, often using potting. The tamper sensors themselves are then usually monitoring the integrity of the whole, potted enclosure more than they monitor the actual HSM circuitry that they're protecting. Common tamper sensors fall in the following three categories.
Environmental Sensors
The most basic sensors monitor the HSM's environmental conditions for anything unusual for normal operation. As a minimum, this means measuring temperature and raising an alarm when it moves out of normal operational bounds (e.g. 0 - 60°C). Temperature sensors can preempt some physical attacks such as Memory Remanence Attacks that either cool the device to preserve memory state across a reset, or heat it to cause accelerated aging of memory cells.
On top of temperature sensors, voltage sensors on power rails as well as clock frequency watchdogs on the system's clock sources serve as a simple system health check and can detect some types of attacks such as certain voltage fault injection attacks that require lowering the system voltage below safe boundaries.
Ionising radiation sensors, which in the simplest case can be a single large-area photodiode, can detect attempts to image the interior of the HSM using X-ray or CT imaging.
Visible light and gas pressure sensors can be used to make it more difficult for an attacker to open a sealed enclosure.
Mechanical sensors
Monitoring the basic mechanical integrity of the HSM can also be quite effective. Simple measures include switches that detect the removal of enclosure components, electrical contacts at screws that detect removal of the screw, and pressure-sensitive contacts in stacks of enclosure parts that detect disassembly. Beyond HSMs, in the wild several types of these contacts are commonly found in card payment terminals, where they are used to defend against criminals trying to install skimmers.
Tamper Sensing Meshes
While environmental monitoring and mechanical integrity sensors are already quite effective, it's conceivable that a skilled attacker could circumvent them, e.g. by bridging mechanical contacts or drilling out photodiodes in the dark before disassembly. To detect against such advanced attacker, a Tamper Sensing Mesh (TSM) can be used as a second line of defense. A TSM is nothing more than a circuit trace embedded in the HSM that is designed to cover as much area as possible with as little gaps as possible such that an attacker has a hard time cutting or drilling through the TSM to access whatever lies behind.
In HSMs, TSMs are commonly implemented as a Flexible Printed Circuit (FPC) on a foil that is wrapped around the HSM's protected payload. Key criteria for the design of a good tamper-sensing mesh are that it covers its payload without gaps (especially at corners), and that it is difficult to remove intact. To achieve the latter, TSMs are often made from fragile materials and then potted inside a strong resin.
If you want to have a closer look at how TSMs are done in practice, have a look at this paper in which jaseg present the results of a large scale survey of TSMs found in the real world.
TDR-Based Mesh Monitoring
Environmental sensors are easy to include in a HSM design. All you need to do is to drop a ready-made sensor such as a photodiode or a temperature sensor into your design. In contrast, effective Tamper-Sensing Meshes are much harder to design. In commercial HSMs, the mesh foils are expensive components made with bespoke, special-purpose machines. One goal of the Yanartas project is to make effective TSMs accessible to hackers without all of this bespoke equipment using open source. We achieve this by combining a low-tech TSM made from a normal circuit board that wouldn't be very secure on its own with a high-tech sensing approach based on Time Domain Reflectometry. The details of the sensing approach are laid out in a paper published by project lead jaseg during their PhD.
The Yanartas Designs
unoq-baseline: Yanartas Unoq Demo Mesh Adapter
unoq-baseline is a really simple design that allows connecting two Tamper-Sensing Meshes or other tamper sensors to an Arduino Uno Q Linux Single-Board Computer. The Uno Q already contains a powerful STM32U585 microcontroller that is easily able to run ashen-firmware. This board is a simple adapter between the Uno Q and the FFC-30P-6M4 Yanartas 30-pin mesh connector.
Status: In development, first prototype expected by end of November 2026.
proto-01-transparent: See-through Pillowbox Mesh Demo
proto-01-transparent is a see-through pillow box tamper sensing mesh made using the Yanartas Pillowbox Generator. It's mostly for demonstration use, because you can see through it. It lacks the ground planes that would be necessary to use it with the TDR sensing board, but it can be used in continuity/short sensing mode with the unoq demo board. The board uses the first four out of the six mesh segments on the the the FFC-30P-6M4 Yanartas 30-pin mesh connector.
Status: Prototypes finished and confirmed working.
warp: TDR Prototype
warp is a TDR-only sensor board prototype with a carrier board designed to take a Raspberry Pi Compute Module 5. warp does not include any other tamper sensors and is meant for development of the TDR sensing frontend and firmware. The board supports the full pinout of the FFC-30P-6M4 Yanartas 30-pin mesh connector and carries a powerful STM32 microcontroller capable of running the full ashen-firmware stack.
Status: In development, first prototype (version v1 2026-11-16) expected by end of November 2026.
weft: Environmental sensor prototype
Complementing the warp TDR mesh sensor, weft is a prototype design exploring various environmental sensors. warp is based on the Arduino Uno Q platform and is derived from unoq-baseline. It still carries the baseline's continuity/short only mesh sensing connectors, which are simply passed through to the STM32 like in the baseline design.
Status: In development at the system design stage. First prototypes are expected end of December 2026.